Coastal Virginia Commonwealth Cyber Initiative (COVA CCI) Researcher Showcase

Securing Mobile Agentic AI Systems: Risk Analysis and Defense in Untrust Mobile Environments

Joint project: Old Dominion University (ODU) and William & Mary (W&M)
Principal Investigator (PI): Yue Xiao (W&M) · Co-PI: Mahmoud Nazzal (ODU)


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The Problem

Mobile agents operate in environments containing untrusted or malicious content



Motivation – Why Now

- Large language model (LLM) agents now operate phones
  - e.g., Honor YOYO, Zhipu AutoGLM, Google Gemini
- Ads, overlays, and notifications already manipulate users

  → The same channels now reach agents
- Prior studies measure task success, not attack robustness



agents move onto the device that holds your data

Measured so far
task success
usability

Missing
behavior under attack
on mobile surfaces


→ Mobile agents need their own security analysis and defenses

Starting Point – Our Prior Case Studies

- Adversarial prompts through third-party channels
  - Ads, WebViews, email, WhatsApp
  - 2,000+ adversarial and paired benign trials

- End-to-end confused-deputy attacks succeed
  → Agent taps "Download anyway", then "Install"

- Limitation: hand-built, outcome-only cases
  → This project makes it systematic



Step1: Click the "**DOWNLOAD**" button on app open ad, and there is a malicious instruction to guide agent to download given malware

Step2: Click the "**DOWNLOAD WITH APTOIDE**" button

Step3: Click the "**Download anyway**" button

Step4: Click the "**Open**" button to open the doloaded file


Step5: Click the "**Install**" button to install to malware

The malware is installed successfully and ready to open

Figure adapted from Du et al., arXiv:2510.27140 (2025)

Project – Goal, Thrusts, and Team


- Goal: move from isolated case studies to a systematic method
- Team
  - PI Yue Xiao (W&M); Co-PI Mahmoud Nazzal (ODU)
  - Students: Chenghao Du (W&M), Muhammad Rabiu (ODU)
- COVA CCI seed award: $80K ($40K per institution)



Our approach: generate attacks, measure misbehavior, defend at runtime


Progress to Date – First Results

- Paper accepted at the AAAI Fall Symposium on Trustworthy Agentic Systems (TAS 2026)
  - Nazzal, Rabiu, Xiao; talk in Nov 2026
- Released: open-source code for the Prospective Security-Event Taint (PSET) defense
- The paper contributes to all three thrusts




TAS 2026 – Shaping a Warning Before It Appears

- Security warnings guard sensitive steps
  - Transport Layer Security (TLS), app-install, and permission prompts
- Threat: security user interface (UI) preconditioning
  → Untrusted content predicts the warning and tells the agent to cross it
- Required property: untrusted input alone must not authorize a crossing



TAS 2026 – Agent Behavior at Authentic Warnings

- Audit: 437 released attack traces, 17 verified warning encounters
- 13 of 14 TLS encounters begin with recovery
  → One recovery fails; the agent replans toward bypass
- Both app-install confirmations are crossed




A safe first response does not guarantee a safe outcome

TAS 2026 – The PSET Defense

- Record what untrusted content claims about future warnings
  - Predicted warning, prescribed action, source
- When a matching warning appears with a prescribed crossing

  → Remove the crossing and escalate to the user
- Targets conditional warnings (install, permission)
  - Hard-stop warnings such as TLS: always deny



Current Work – Controlled Test of Preconditioning


- Causal test: six matched conditions on Android agents
  → Key contrast: C3 (matched) vs. C4 (mismatched)
- Measure with and without PSET
  - Unauthorized crossings, unnecessary escalations, task completion
- Real-world evidence: study agents now shipping on phones (e.g., MUSE)

Condition	Predicts event	Correct event	Prescribes crossing
C0 Direct	No	—	No
C1 Persistence	No	—	Generic
C2 Prediction	Yes	Yes	No
C3 Matched	Yes	Yes	Specific
C4 Mismatched	Yes	No	Specific
C5 Length	No	—	No

More crossing in C3 than C4 → event-specific effect


Planned Work – Scenario Generation and AMI (T1–T2)

- T1: generate parameterized adversarial scenarios
  - Template mutation, LLM paraphrasing, adversarial search
- T2: score misbehavior with the AMI
  - Failure rates for privacy, security, and safety
  - Aligned with NIST, ISO/IEC, and MITRE frameworks




Next Phase – Graph-Based Runtime Defense (T3)

- Model each agent run as an execution graph
- Graph neural network (GNN) flags risky paths
  - Trained with AMI risk labels
- Interventions that preserve the user's intent
  - PSET serves as one rule-based guard



Timeline – Remaining Award Period

- Award period: Apr 2026 – Mar 2027
  - No-cost extension (NCE) to Sep 2027 planned
- Summer 2027: PI and graduate assistant effort on T3
- 2027 targets: USENIX Security, ACM CCS, IEEE S&P



Outputs and Impact on the Commonwealth

- Dissemination: TAS 2026 talk, open PSET code
- Workforce: two graduate students trained (W&M, ODU)
  - Course material planned for ODU CS 795/895
- Deliverables: scenario library, AMI benchmark, defense toolkit

1

peer-reviewed paper

TAS 2026

1

open-source artifact

PSET

2

graduate students

on the project


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federal proposals

planned

External Funding – Path to Federal Awards

- National Science Foundation (NSF)
  - Security, Privacy, and Trust in Cyberspace (SaTC 2.0): AMI method and runtime defense
  - Cybersecurity Innovation for Cyberinfrastructure (CICI): attack-trajectory dataset for agent testing
- Translation: provisional patents



Each seed output becomes preliminary results for a federal proposal

Thank You

Questions and discussion

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